Following on from a previous look at Lib Dem runner-up places,[1] we thought it might be revealing to look at what happened to votes cast in the 57 seats the Lib Dems were defending from the 2010 general election. Whilst it is widely recognised that the party lost 49 of those seats – a failure rate of 86% – there is still much denial and delusion as to what happened across those seats, or where those votes went, making such an analysis all the more overdue.

Nationally, the Lib Dem vote crumbled, with 4.4 million fewer votes in 2015 than 2010 – a loss of 64.7% of the party’s previous vote. In 626 out of 631 constituencies contested, the Lib Dem vote fell. This effect was replicated in most of the held seats –particularly Conservative-facing ones, which were supposed to be the ones where the Lib Dem vote was expected to hold, as per Ryan Coetzee’s strategy.

However, the underlying trends can be broken down into four broad groups: seats gained by the Conservatives, seats gained by Labour, seats gained by the SNP, and seats held by Liberal Democrats.  Furthermore, such general election results should also be seen in the context of results from the local elections held on the same day.

Elsewhere, attention has focussed on changes in the Lib Dem vote share. We would like to do something slightly different, and to focus on the actual number of votes cast, to identify how the votes changed in the 57 seats previously held by the Lib Dems.

The Conservative-facing seats showed a remarkably consistent pattern; the main factor at play was Lib Dem collapse rather than Conservative recovery. In each of the 27 seats lost to the Conservatives, the collapse in Lib Dem votes was sizeably larger than any increase in Tory votes, by a factor of anything up to 29.

This has a number of implications.  Firstly, it means that in 21 out of these 27 seats, the Conservatives ended up taking the constituency in 2015 with fewer votes than the Lib Dems did in 2010. Only in six seats did Conservative support in 2015 outnumber Lib Dem support in 2010: Chippenham; Solihull; Somerton and Frome; St Austell and Newquay; Mid Dorset and Poole North; and Wells (and in the case of St Austell and Newquay, Conservative support was just 61 votes higher than the Lib Dem vote in 2010.)  Indeed, in Eastbourne, the Conservative vote actually fell from 2010, yet Conservatives still took the seat because of the Lib Dem collapse. This means that although the Lib Dem position in many Tory-facing seats is dire following a collapse of the party’s vote, the Conservative position is not necessarily ‘safe’ or stable; the Conservatives have won many of these seats on relatively small popular votes, and there still exists in these constituencies a reasonably large non-Conservative vote which could potentially be mobilised around a clear anti-Conservative candidate with a more appealing pitch than that of the 2015 Lib Dem campaign. Nor is the Conservative vote appreciably growing much in such areas. In seats like Lewes, Portsmouth South, St Ives, Sutton and Cheam, and Torbay, the increase in Conservative votes was negligible, and Lib Dem defeat can be laid down entirely to so much of the Lib Dem vote having vanished.

Secondly, it points to the net transfer of votes in these seats not having been from the Lib Dems to the Conservatives. While the Conservatives were the ultimate beneficiaries due to their pre-existing positioning in second place, Lib Dem losses of votes went in all directions – Conservative, Labour, UKIP and Green.

In 18 of the 27 seats lost to the Tories, the party that gained the most votes while the Lib Dems declined was UKIP. Indeed, in some seats like St Austell and Newquay, St Ives, and Sutton and Cheam, the UKIP gain in votes was several times higher than that of the Conservatives. This fact substantially challenges a number of existing preconceptions about the nature of the UKIP vote, and where it comes from. Certainly, on the face of it this would seem to point to direct Lib Dem-to-UKIP voter transfer, and this undoubtedly did happen on some scale. However, there is also a wider phenomenon of cross-party voter churn and more complex voter patterns having gone on. We were kindly shown an advance copy of some of the data that David Howarth has extrapolated from the British Election Study data, and it presented substantial evidence that such cross-voting was going on in held Lib Dem seats, with Lib Dem losses to the Conservatives in previously-held Lib Dem seats, and Conservative losses to UKIP in such seats. This is not the place to pre-empt Howarth’s own findings, but we recognise their importance and relevance here.  What is clear is that the UKIP vote was drawn from all parties – including the Lib Dems, and included a “Plague on all your houses”, anti-Establishment pitch of the kind that the Lib Dems had previously been adept at making, and which Nick Clegg had noticeably shunned in favour of a “responsible party of government” pitch.

Was the UKIP surge in these seats enough to account for the loss of so many Tory-facing Lib Dem seats? No. But it was a major factor in combination with others. In particular, while the Green ‘bounce’ in most of these 27 seats was smaller than the UKIP ‘bounce’, it is noticeable that the rise in Green and UKIP votes taken together – the votes for the two main ‘protest vote’ parties in England – was larger than the Tory votes gained in 26 of these 27 seats. In other words, the Lib Dem loss of the protest vote, and the protest vote being transferred to both UKIP and the Greens, was almost certainly critical in the loss of 26 Lib Dem seats to the Conservatives.  Only Twickenham had a higher rise in the Tory vote than the UKIP+Green combination.

In comparison, the rise in the Labour vote in these Tory-facing constituencies was (with some exceptions) relatively modest. Where Labour was the ‘big winner’ in Tory-facing Lib Dem held seats, gaining the most votes from 2010, was in suburban seats like Cheadle (where no Green candidate stood, and so the only ‘left-wing’ alternative party to the Lib Dems was Labour), and Kingston and Surbiton. By contrast, in the traditional West Country Lib-Con marginals, Labour’s vote only rose modestly (as in Mid Dorset and Poole North where Labour support rose by just 19 votes), or even fell in the face of a strong UKIP showing (as in Wells). Thus whilst there was a general loss of some support to Labour in these Tory-facing seats, it was far from pivotal in most cases; and generally pales in comparison to net loss of votes to UKIP and the Greens.


Seats gained by Labour

The 12 Labour gains from the Liberal Democrats were far more likely to have been due to a Labour surge than due to a Lib Dem collapse. In some of these seats, the Lib Dem vote even held up relatively well, most notably Bradford East, Burnley and Cambridge – in the latter, for instance, Julian Huppert still polled 18,047 votes compared to the 19,621 he had polled in 2010, which was an exceptionally strong showing compared to the nationwide collapse in the Lib Dem popular vote; however, in most of these seats, there was still a sizeable drop in Lib Dem support, most conspicuously Brent Central, which suffered the biggest Lib Dem drop in support in the country.

In eight of the 12 seats, the party that gained the most votes was Labour. Only in Birmingham Yardley, Bristol West, Burnley and Redcar was this not the case – in three of those four examples barring Bristol West (with its huge Green surge), UKIP actually gained more ‘new’ votes than Labour did, but Labour’s pre-existing second place was sufficient to see them through to victory. In the remaining eight seats, there was a noticeable Labour surge; a sharp contrast to the conspicuous lack of any comparable Conservative surge in most Tory-facing Lib Dem seats.

Consequently, this has left Labour in a much more secure position in several of these seats, than the Conservatives across their Lib Dem-facing seats. Brent Central appears hopeless for the Lib Dems for the foreseeable future, the party now back in distant third place. And in nine of the 12 Labour gains from the Lib Dems, Labour polled more votes in 2015 than the Lib Dems did in 2010; in short, if the Lib Dems had replicated their 2010 poll, they would still have been unable to overcome Labour advances into these seats. Only in Bristol West, Cambridge and Redcar was this not the case. Nonetheless, the Labour-facing Lib Dem marginals present a far more complicated picture than the Conservative- or SNP-facing seats, and defy the same kind of easier categorisation and generalisation; each of the 12 seats has its own distinctive quirks. Indeed, if we now include the Lib Dem hold of Sheffield Hallam as a Labour-facing seat, then the singularity of the Labour-facing results is confirmed.


Seats gained by the SNP

As with the Conservatives, the picture was relatively simple and consistent, across the 10 Lib Dem seats lost to the SNP. The decisive factor was the SNP surge. The colossal scale of the SNP rise (which memorably “broke” the BBC swingometer on election night)  was such that in nine of the 10 seats, the SNP held larger popular votes in 2015 than the Lib Dems did in 2010, sometimes by quite extraordinary margins; most notably, Alex Salmond polled 10,142 votes more at Gordon than Malcolm Bruce did in 2010. 

Paradoxically, despite the SNP winning a clutch of large majorities, surging to victory from second, third or even fourth place, Scotland actually had some of the “best” election results for Lib Dems in terms of votes. Five previously-held Scottish Lib Dem seats, all ultimately lost to the SNP, were actually the only seats in the UK where the Lib Dems increased the number of votes they polled in 2015 over 2010: Argyll and Bute; Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross; East Dunbartonshire; Edinburgh West; and Gordon.  (The lack of an incumbent candidate in Gordon makes this last result all the more remarkable, and flies in the face of the received wisdom that an ‘incumbent bounce’ was as widely prevalent as Lib Dem campaigners predicted it would be.)

Of the remaining five Lib Dem seats lost to the SNP, the Lib Dem vote did not actually fall by that much in three of them; only in Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk, and West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine was the Lib Dem drop in popular vote sizeable; these were two exceptionally bad results, and along with Brent Central and Bristol West constituted two of the four held seats where Lib Dems dropped from first place to third.

Overall, aside from these last two results, Lib Dem performance against the SNP was quite respectable; a fact obscured by the scale of the SNP rise. However, as noted in a previous analysis of runner-up places,  Scotland also had some of the worst Lib Dem results in the UK, particularly in Glasgow. Accordingly, it is fair to say that Scotland saw mass-targeting efforts, and most likely sizeable Unionist tactical voting from Labour and Conservatives alike within most of the SNP-facing Lib Dem seats; but that given the scale of the SNP’s margin of victory across most of these 10 seats, such tactics were still inadequate.

Seats held by the Liberal Democrats

How were the eight seats held by the Liberal Democrats different in their transfer of votes to the forty-nine which were lost? The answer is “Not very”.

The main thing marking out all eight seats was that the Conservative vote dropped in all of them, defying the national swing (even if in Orkney and Shetland, it dropped by just seven votes.)  On paper, six of these seats should have been Conservative-facing – although Hallam turned out to be Labour-facing, as did Leeds North-West which was Conservative-facing in 2010 and has been both a Labour and Conservative seat in the last twenty years. The four seats which were Conservative-facing in 2015 saw the kinds of drops in Lib Dem vote associated with the 27 other Tory-facing seats that were lost; but this was not matched by an increase in the Conservative vote. Had the Conservatives held on to their 2010 popular votes in Carshalton and Wallington, and Southport, these too would have been Conservative gains.

Why did the Conservatives move backwards in these eight seats? We would suggest that the rise of UKIP had much to do with it. Although we have identified the UKIP + Green phenomenon as being quite fatal to Lib Dems  in most Tory-facing seats, it may well be that the strong UKIP challenge perversely helped the Lib Dems keep two of their eight seats, due to vote-splitting favouring them in these two instances.

An additional factor may well have been a Conservative willingness to tactically vote Lib Dem where the Lib Dems were competitive; certainly, this is plausible in seats such as Orkney and Shetland, as well as Sheffield Hallam, where the Ashcroft polling indicated Conservative anti-Labour tactical voting on such a scale as to be well beyond any margin of error. This is certainly consistent with an election in which Nick Clegg made little secret of his eagerness to renew his support for another Conservative-led coalition. Nonetheless, the scale of such tactical voting from the Conservatives should not be overstated. It would self-evidently have not been a factor in the four Conservative-facing seats; and while there is some evidence to support it having been a factor in eight of the 10 SNP-facing Lib Dem seats that were still lost, it only seems to have happened on any great scale in three of the 12 Labour-facing seats, all of which were still ultimately lost (Bradford East, Cambridge and Hornsey and Wood Green). Accordingly if it did exist as a factor, it did so on a relatively small scale, and ‘soft’ Conservative tactical voting for the Lib Dems was an ultimately unsuccessful strategy.

Only two of the seats held by the Lib Dems were Labour-facing in 2015: Leeds North-West, and Sheffield Hallam, both of which had scored Labour third places in 2010. Given that Hallam exhibited an almost Portillo-defying swing of 16.55% which saw Labour leap-frog from third place and 19,096 votes behind Nick Clegg to within 2,353 votes of unseating him, the circumstances of that particular seat seem most unusual. Indeed, given that Lib Dem activists were diverted from neighbouring regions like the East Midlands, that the leader’s election schedule noticeably accommodated Clegg spending at least two days a week in his constituency (a highly unusual feature for any modern leader of a major party – even Michael Howard largely ignored the attempted Lib Dem ‘decapitation’ of him in 2005), and that national resources were clearly thrown at the seat, it seems likely that the Lib Dem leadership was rattled by the five constituency polls from three sources which all forecast Clegg’s defeat. How much money was diverted to the seat will have to wait for the publication of Electoral Commission returns, but the diversion of activists from elsewhere was crucial. Given that Cambridge (also reachable for East Midlands activists) was lost by just 599 votes, and that the margin of defeat for some Lib Dem MPs was quite narrow (i.e. 733 votes in Eastbourne, 1,083 votes in Lewes), it may well be that the strategic decision to spare the party leader’s blushes and save Clegg in Hallam actually cost the party several seats elsewhere.

Against the Nationalists, the party held two seats, but it is difficult to extrapolate much from these two results. Mark Williams held on in Ceredigion, despite the loss of nearly a third of his vote, mainly due to his Plaid opponents actually falling back rather than advancing. Orkney and Shetland displayed an SNP surge similar to that found across Scotland, but Alistair Carmichael seems to have held onto his personal vote relatively well, with the smallest drop in votes (admittedly, amongst a tiny electorate) of any of the eight held Lib Dem seats – a far cry from Norman Lamb, who experienced the biggest absolute drop among the eight survivors.

The local election dimension

As well as the general election, there were also local elections across much of England. While these were also a disaster for the Liberal Democrats, the contours of the disaster were somewhat different.

Local elections taking place on the same day as a general election allows a finer-grained analysis of the trends; the differences between local and parliamentary voting patterns throw up information about the strength of personal votes and incumbency and the number of voters who make different choices at each level. They also illuminate the distribution of votes for parties within parliamentary constituencies, although this paper concentrates on the overall differences between local and general voting in whole constituencies.

Of the 57 seats that elected Liberal Democrat MPs in 2010 and were being defended in 2015, there were comparable local elections in 29 of them (plus the target seat of Watford). The 11 Scottish seats, the seven in London, three in Wales and three in Cornwall are excluded because they had no local elections, and nor did Berwick-upon-Tweed, Cheltenham and Chippenham. Westmorland & Lonsdale did have partial local elections, but too much of the constituency (including the main town of Kendal) was not up for election this year, and it has therefore been excluded. Compiling local election results by constituency is a contentious exercise – the cautious reader is directed to the appendix to this section – and in making the comparison, it is also necessary to put figures in vote share terms, rather than in absolute number of votes.

There were eight 2010 Liberal Democrat seats out of the 29 with comparable local elections where the result of the local and national elections was different, namely:

•           Norfolk North, where Norman Lamb won despite the Conservatives winning in the local elections;

•           Eastbourne, Thornbury & Yate, Bath, Yeovil, Portsmouth South and most dramatically Eastleigh where the Conservatives won the parliamentary seat and the Lib Dems ‘won’ the local elections in the equivalent area.  In Eastleigh, there was a 16.5% Conservative lead in the General Election voting and a 5% Lib Dem lead in the local elections.

•           Bristol West was won by Labour in the General Election, and the Greens in the local elections. The Lib Dems were third in both contests. 

Among the eight constituencies where the Liberal Democrats did better (relative to their main competitor party) in the general election:

•           There were four seats that were unambiguously Conservative-facing (Norfolk North, Wells, Solihull, Lewes);

•           Two where the Conservatives were second in 2010 but where Labour were the principal competitors in 2015 (Leeds North West, Cambridge);

•           Two where the competition was unambiguously between Labour and Lib Dems (Burnley, Bradford East).

Among the 21 constituencies where the Liberal Democrats did better in the local elections and worse in the general election there were: 

•           Three unambiguously Labour-facing seats (Manchester Withington, Redcar, Birmingham Yardley);

•           Two Labour-facing seats with a significant Green presence (Norwich South, Bristol West)

•           One seat where the Conservatives were second in 2010 but where Labour were the principal competitors in 2015 (Sheffield Hallam);

•           Fifteen constituencies which are Lib Dem v Conservative contests, of which at most two had serious UKIP presences (Torbay, Southport, Devon North, Colchester, Eastbourne, Thornbury & Yate, Cheadle, Hazel Grove, Yeovil, Portsmouth South, Somerton & Frome, Taunton Deane, Eastleigh, Dorset Mid & North Poole).

The constituency results demonstrate a wide range of patterns. The very worst results – relatively and absolutely – in the general election were in a number of Con/Lib Dem marginals in southern England: Watford, Mid Dorset & North Poole, Eastleigh, Taunton Deane, Somerton & Frome, Portsmouth South, and Yeovil. These made up the cases that fit the general description, but where the Lib Dem MP managed to keep pace or exceed the local election vote all the more remarkable – Wells, Torbay and Lewes in particular, plus Norman Lamb’s singular success in Norfolk North.

In some of the constituencies, the dominant net effect was simply that the Conservatives ran way ahead of their local election vote and the Lib Dems way behind – Eastleigh is the clearest case of this.

This does indicate that there was a ‘soft’ Lib Dem vote that was prepared to support the party’s local election candidates but voted Conservative nationally – there has always been an element of this in some constituencies including Eastleigh, but it seemed particularly large in 2015. This does suggest there was something – in some constituencies anyway – to the explanation offered by some Lib Dem strategists that fear ended up propelling these people into voting Tory. However, short of committing to a permanent alliance with the Tories, it is difficult to imagine what more the Lib Dems could have done to reassure these voters since 2010! Winning back this group will depend on them losing faith in the Conservatives as offering stability and competence, and on the alternative (be it Labour or a more complex arrangement) being detoxified.

While the same pattern applied to some extent in Yeovil, there was probably more churn going on. UKIP stood a particularly incomplete slate in the local elections, meaning that they were bound to do better in the general election at the expense of the other parties – probably all three other parties in varying proportions. But there was still a net transfer from Lib Dem local to Conservative general going on under the churn as well as protest voters splitting their support between Lib Dem local and UKIP general.

Torbay was different again – while there may have been a LG-LD GE-Con vote in there, the dominant pattern looked like a tactical rally around the two main parties in the parliamentary contest – local government voters for Labour and Green supporting Adrian Sanders and – probably – many UKIP local voters going Conservative nationally.

There was a puzzling pattern in Bath that probably reflected a large number of cross-currents between local and national; but it was clear that even if one assumes most of the Independent vote in the local elections was right wing, there was a net transfer from Green to Conservative and UKIP for the general election, presumably via a LG-Green GE-LD vote and a LG-LD GE-Con vote.

The presence of a significant bit of the Conservative GE vote that split their support with the Lib Dems at local level is interesting, but there is a risk of drawing the wrong conclusions – that it was small or non-existent in Torbay and huge in Yeovil suggests that the Lib Dems positioning further to the right may not be the solution. It may well reflect that the Conservative general election vote in 2015 was highly conditional and uncertain – and possibly one that was pushed in the Tory direction by the repeated support of many Lib Dems for the broad claims made for Conservative government in terms of economic management and stability.

In Sheffield Hallam Nick Clegg did better than his local running mates, but Labour’s Oliver Coppard exceeded the local Labour score by even more. The Conservative and UKIP shares were, unusually, lower in the General Election, probably reflecting tactical voting for Clegg, but the Green local vote rallied more strongly than usual around Labour in the General Election. Comparing for a moment with Cambridge, another seat where Labour displaced the Tories as the challenge party: Julian Huppert seems to have been able to attract significant support – nearly enough to win – from people who voted for other parties in the local elections – probably in his case a considerable number of Green supporters as well as some from Labour and the Conservatives.

Birmingham Yardley was an unusual Labour-facing analogue to the Eastleigh pattern; more usually in the Labour-facing seats the local vote seemed to collapse alongside the general election vote. The local candidates in Yardley were able to outscore the parliamentary vote by a clear margin; it does seem that there was a significant proportion of the LG-LD vote that could not support the party’s national stance and voted Labour (or another party) rather than do so.

While there is more analysis to do on all of this, even a cursory glance suggests some interesting patterns. The tables below show the aggregate results for each category of seat.

A further stage of the analysis will involve comparing local election performance in 2011-14 with local and general performance in 2015. It was true in some seats that the Lib Dems remained ahead in local election votes throughout the parliament but lost in 2015 (Hazel Grove and Birmingham Yardley being the most striking cases). Particularly in the Conservative-facing seats, traditional Liberal Democrat campaigning methods managed to keep the party viable in 30-40 per cent turnout local elections but failed when the electorate was swollen to general election levels.

Looking forward, the local elections suggest some possibilities for further targeting and some seats that should be taken off the boards. There seems some logic in regarding seats in which the Lib Dems won the local elections as being the most likely targets for regaining – particularly Bath, where there was no incumbency factor, and Eastbourne; there are at least pluralities of voters in the six seats concerned that were prepared to put a cross in the Lib Dem box even in 2015. The least encouraging results from the point of view of future Lib Dem gains are those where the local government vote was weaker than the parliamentary vote and the 2015 parliamentary vote benefited from an incumbency effect which will not be present next time.



By far the largest tranche of seats lost was due to the loss of ‘protest votes’ – something the party could ill afford to do without. At least 20 seats turned Conservative, not because of great transfers from the Lib Dems to the Tories (or even Labour), but because of major net transfers of support from the Lib Dems to a combination of both UKIP and the Greens (although this included some cross-voting).  In Scotland, the party suffered heavily from the rise of the SNP juggernaut (as did Labour), but its vote actually held up surprisingly well in previously-held seats – even though it also collapsed elsewhere in Scotland – and it remains competitive in half of the 10 seats it lost to the SNP. In most Labour-facing seats, there was a noticeable Labour recovery (which was not found in many Lab-Con marginal outside London); and combined with the Lib Dem collapse, this proved devastating in every Labour-facing Lib Dem seat except Leeds North West and Sheffield Hallam, both of which had previously had Labour in third place. Where the party survived, it survived (in part) due to Conservative underperformance in the eight held seats, in two cases due to a UKIP intervention; but mostly, local factors and chance helped the seats to buck the national trend.

There is some evidence to support the existence of an ‘incumbency factor’ for popular local MPs, and comparing local and national election results shows just how large it could be in some seats; however, its extent was by no means uniform. All seven previously-held seats for which data exists where a new PPC was standing showed no GE ‘bounce’, and a minus (or zero) score over council election vote share – but exceptions in Scotland like Gordon flew in the face of this. Furthermore, at least six incumbent Lib Dem MPs seeking re-election showed negative ‘bounces’ over local election results:  John Hemming in Birmingham Yardley, Mark Hunter in Cheadle, David Laws in Yeovil, Mike Thornton in Eastleigh, Steve Webb in Thornbury and Yate; and last but not least, Simon Wright in Norwich South – who had the worst result of any incumbent Lib Dem MP and came fourth. The incumbency effect should therefore not be overstated as a factor. Even in four of the six seats where the ‘incumbency effect’ was largest (Cambridge, Devon North, Lewes and Torbay), it was still not enough for the party to cling on to the parliamentary seat.

If a party polls 7.9% nationally, it can expect to win anything between fifteen seats and zero. In this light, holding onto eight seats can be seen as a triumph in light of the party’s dismal national showing, and indeed, the question should not be why the Lib Dems won so few seats, but how they managed to hold on to so many given the low support they attracted nationally; by contrast, losing nearly two-thirds of its once-sizeable electoral coalition, which was consistently ±3% from 20% in the six previous general elections in 1987-2010, must surely rank as one of the great cock-ups of British electoral history.

If Lib Dems are to take back any or many of these seats, they will need a strong, persuasive, positive, distinctive anti-Establishment positioning; as the party’s centrist stance – characterised by its “Stronger economy, fairer society” slogan – did little to draw or retain its pre-existing coalition of voters, and the evidence overwhelmingly points to it having actively repelled many of them.

APPENDIX - Local and general elections: caveats 

There are numerous pitfalls and problems in comparing local and general election voting behaviour. The aim of this part of the analysis has been to draw out the genuine differences in votes cast between the two that are a matter of political choice by the electors. The concurrent nature of the elections in these constituencies means that two factors that normally cloud the comparison (namely the difference in time and context between, say, the London borough elections of 2014 and the general election of 2015, and the fact that turnout is normally around 30-40 per cent in local elections and 60-70 per cent in general elections).

Other comparison problems remain, including:

•           Different choices of candidate at local and national level – for instance, UKIP’s coverage in the local elections was incomplete in many areas. Voters who supported UKIP in the general election therefore were unable to mirror this choice in the local elections in many areas (had they wished to) – and therefore voted for other parties, abstained, or spoiled their ballots. In one case, Mid Dorset & North Poole, there were hardly any Labour candidates in the local elections, and the Labour general election vote had to come from somewhere; it is likely that the gap between local and national support for the Lib Dems is not as huge there as it seems from the raw figures.

•           A special case of this problem is that some wards had no local elections at all, either because the ward was uncontested (as in Wells), or (as in Colchester) the local election cycle meant that the ward was not up for election in 2015. These cases are compensated for in the results tables(while those with incomplete slates are allowed to stand) using dummy results based on those from 2014 where possible, adjusted for higher turnout and political trends between 2014 and 2015 (i.e. UKIP vote in particular a bit lower, Conservative a bit higher).

•           Local elections in many areas – particularly the more rural constituencies – are fought using multi-member wards. Even when the parties all stand candidates for all the vacancies, voters are free to pick and choose between each party’s slate and they often do in considerable numbers. It is therefore not obvious what the party’s baseline vote in the local elections should be. The vote share used here is an average of the two principal methods of calculation – using top candidates’ votes (which exaggerates turnout and the vote share for smaller parties), and using the total votes for all the party’s candidates (which understates the vote share for smaller parties). Both methods distort the number of voters casting ballots, making it impossible to make direct contrasts with the general election numerical vote.

•           The franchise is different for local elections. This is a minor factor in most of the seats under discussion here although it is significant in London.



About the authors

Lewis Baston is a psephologist and writer on politics, history and elections and past Director of Research at the Electoral Reform Society and research fellow at Democratic Audit. He has written several books of electoral geography as well as the biography of Reggie Maudling and a short book about scandals and corruption.


Dr Seth Thévoz is a political, cultural and social historian of Britain from 1800 on, and specialises in social networks, and detecting corruption among legislators. He is a member of the Federal Finance and Administration Committee, and in his spare time he is Honorary Librarian of the National Liberal Club.

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