Five things we must never do again

We must never again accept coalition with the Tories - Every time the party has entered into a coalition with the Tories it has come out seriously damaged. The one in the 1930s ended in a three way split and national irrelevance. This one might be worse. It is a near-death experience. We must never do this again. Why does this happen? Largely because we are a party built on values, not on protecting interests, and coalition with the Tories obscures the public's view of our values. We end up looking like a party of manoeuvre, caring only about holding office.

We must never again promote coalitionism - Much worse than entering a coalition is adopting the stance that coalitions are good in themselves because they bring 'stability'. If people want stability they vote Conservative. The final week of the 2015 campaign was ludicrous. Getting supporters to wave placards saying 'Stability' and 'Unity' was not only deeply illiberal (it looked like something out of Vichy France) it was also deeply stupid. It played into the Tories' main strength. A party such as ours, a party that wants change, cannot make stability its main goal.

We must never again push centrism - Saying that we are between the other two gets in the way of saying who we are and what we are for. Worse, it leaves us with a very small group of voters who believe that both the other parties are extreme. For all other voters, our argument reinforces the view that voting for us risks putting into power the people they were against.  That is why we lost seats both to Labour and to the Tories.

We must never again ignore evidence – The party knew Nick was toxic. It knew that 'vote for us because the economy is improving' would not and could not work. But it did nothing.

We must never again fail to have the will to change - The party must never again refuse to change an obviously catastrophic course. It must never again allow itself to be bullied, bribed or bamboozled by a failed leadership into taking no action. Perhaps even more important, it should never again succumb to fatalism, to the argument that overwhelmed much of the party in 2014 that we had set our course and must accept whatever shipwreck came along.

Three things to do now

Clarify our values - We are a party of values or we are nothing. An effective party of values, however, needs to do certain things. The most important is to achieve clarity about its values. Parties that define themselves around collective interests (for example classes and nations) can afford to be vague about their political values – which both Labour and the SNP are. But we can't be vague. Some of our values are clear –  internationalism, protecting individuality and non-conformity, hating bullying and the abuse of power,  promoting environmentalism, protecting civil liberties and a love of democracy not so much because we think it efficient or effective but because it expresses a basic equality of respect for all individuals. But some of our values are not clear. Most significantly, what is our view of economic inequality? Do we, like Nick Clegg in his disastrous August 2010 speech, worry only about social mobility, or do we care about inequality of wealth in itself? I think most members do care about inequality of wealth, especially in its gross modern form. But the party is going to need to say so loudly and clearly.

Find new ways of promoting our values - Many people are now saying that we have to rebuild the party from local level, and especially through local government. But that is not enough. Previous eras of building up local strength too often turned into exercises not in promoting our values but merely in building up our electoral ground game. As we have just seen, a strong electoral ground game is no use against an overwhelming political defeat. We need new ways of promoting our values. My suggestion is that we need to organise the party in a new way, around campaigns that flow from our values, campaigns in which members can actively participate both at local and national levels. These shouldn’t just be clicktivism or public relations exercises. As in a local campaign to get something done, we should set out to make a real difference in the world. An immediate example is that we should organise our members to put pressure on MPs and ministers on the snooper’s charter, an issue on which the government’s small majority might easily fall apart. Similarly we will need campaigns to save the Human Rights Act, to preserve Britain’s place in Europe and, though it might be hard to win an anti-NIMBY campaign, against banning new onshore wind farms. We should also be campaigning against the forthcoming £12 billion benefit cuts and more broadly against state bullying of the vulnerable (something we seemed to have stopped doing recently). As in the original ‘dual approach’ to politics pioneered by the Young Liberals 45 years ago, we should be organising resistance both inside and outside political institutions, co-ordinating the two and encouraging citizens to join together to change policies and attitudes. We could even encourage members to choose topics for campaigns and facilitate campaign groups to emerge from the party. In the end, many members might think of their membership not just in geographical terms but also in terms of the campaigns they take part in.

Rebuild a core vote – One of the most disastrous aspects of the Clegg era was that just at the point the party was starting to develop a loyal core vote – roughly speaking, graduates, prospective graduates and the parents and grandparents of graduates – it launched an all-out attack on those very voters. But those voters are still there and still share our values. In fact, there are too few other people who share our values to make us a viable political force without them. So we have to win them back. Campaigning on issues connected with our values will help, but we also need to think about our policies in terms of values and our prospective core voters. That means a comprehensive audit of our policies to eliminate particularistic elements that have crept in over the years through lobbying or the accidents of geography. It is time for a clear focus on finding the natural supporters of Liberalism wherever they are, and rebuilding the party with them. 

Showing 37 reactions

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  • I never accepted any stability need for a Coalition and was not surprised at the resultant disaster. However, I would have accepted a Coalition with the Tories with the acceptance of an offer with a cast iron guarantee for an Act to create PR by STV. Of course the Tories would probably have rejected the offer out of hand. That would have put them in the wrong for having failed to make an agreement for the sake of the nation. We would have been in the clear. If they had given us STV we would have been secure for ever and no disaster.
    The points by David are very good but we need a new values image for the public and maybe even a new name that the less sophisticated public can understand.
  • @zigurds
    I think Tim is saying no coalition without immediate electoral reform, which would certainly be a massive improvement on what just happened and which in practice might well amount to much the same thing as my recommendation.
    If that were to be our position, we would need to return to campaigning all out for electoral reform, which Tim is also proposing, so that if any such government were formed, it could only be portrayed as one influenced by us.
  • Alex more or less sums up what I feel. A coalition with the Tories isn’t always to be ruled out whatever the circumstances. It was our whole approach to the Coalition that sealed our fate. The leadership gave the impression that this was what we had always wanted, rather than emphasising this was a difficult and perhaps even unpleasant choice that we felt we had to make for the good of the country. The rest is history … but the last straw during the election campaign was when Nick refused to make the EU referendum (i.e. not having one) a red line.

    For all the other reasons given in previous comments, the only way to vote in the leadership election is for Tim Farron, much as I like Norman Lamb.
  • @alex,
    I agree completely about the mistakes that were made in the course of the coalition and about the party’s leadership at the time – which seemed focussed almost entirely on using the coalition to force the party to the right.

    But I think there’s a deeper problem. We were wiped out of the public imagination before we were wiped out in the election. It wasn’t just the awful blunders and betrayals of 2010-11. It was the fact that we never recovered from them. That happened because the electorate basically treated us an appendage of the Tories, giving us no credit for what went right but also not blaming us for what went wrong. That was the result of being in coalition with a dominant party whose values are very different from ours. There is room for only one narrative about a government and the one that took hold was ‘this is a Conservative government’. That happened because it was the simplest and clearest story one could tell and because it suited very well both Labour and the Conservatives and their media allies. Our story was complicated and no one else was telling it. I don’t think there was any way for us to have pulled that round or for it to be avoided in similar circumstances in the future.

    On local government, the difference is the relative contributions of the ground war and the air war in the campaign. In local elections we have more of a chance of getting across our definition of the situation because often the only information getting to the electorate comes from our own literature. In a parliamentary election, that isn’t the case.

    In any case I seem to remember very firm advice from ALDC to groups in hung councils that they should at all costs avoid succumbing to ‘an attack of the sensibles’ – that is taking responsibility for everything and being obsessed with ‘stability’ at the cost of the party’s political goals.
  • I agree with all the 5 “Never do this” points except the first (sort of). If, as in 2010, the arithmetic makes coalition with the Tories the only viable option for a stable government, what else are we supposed to do? We have gone into coalition with the Tories in local government before and it has not ended in a rout. We didn’t do badly in the recent election just because we went into coalition with the Tories, we did badly because we totally mishandled it from Day One. The wrong tone was set from the moment Nick & Dave stood side by side in the rose garden. We utterly failed to differentiate ourselves from the Tories; failed ever to say what we would have done differently in a Lib Dem government; we failed to capitalise on the how the two parties’ respective MEPs, unbridled by the Coalition, acted and voted. We could have used them to show what undiluted Toryism AND LibDemmery look like (and pointed to the Tories’ unsavoury right-wing allies in Brussels). We did none of this, and so we looked like slightly nicer Tories, and that is why we got a kicking. I think a coalition with the Tories could have been made to work in our favour, but the recently departed leadership were not the ones to do it.
  • I supported the creation of the Coalition and continued to support it throughout the last parliament. However in the recent LDV survey I was in a surprisingly small minority of members who indicated that we would have taken a different view had we known what we now know in terms of the electoral impact on the LDs. So in identifying lessons on he future we surely need to establish why so many ordinary members, as opposed to activists, still think going into coalition was the right thing to do. However,one one lessons we have in my opinion to learn, as should Labour and the Greens, is that when we abuse each other in our political rhetoric it only benefits the Tories.
  • the trouble with AV was that it was not Lib Dem policy (which was PR), but a compromise which even I thought was designed largely to benefit the Lib Dems. Certainly it would not be good for UKIP. It is better than FPTP, mainly because it removes any need for tactical voting (which might have been very very bad for us on 8%, BTW!)

    Politics students were evidently not very representative of the electorate!
  • Andrew,
    I was still a Councillor during the AV referendum and spoke to two classes of politics students at the local college. We had the Tory Council leader and a labour councillor as well on a panel. We spoke and answered questions. One question I was given was over the collapse of popularity for Nick Clegg. A straw poll showed about 75% support for AV at the beginning and about 90% at the end. I think that any educated argument will favour AV over FPTP. You are correct to say the AV referendum was to some degree turned into a vote about Nick Clegg. Tory arguments suggested AV was PR and even insulted the public by saying that counting to three was too difficult. Labour are also not keen on electoral reform and were pretty much absent from the debate and fuelled the anti Clegg sentiment. It was a real uphill struggle to get the Yes to AV debate going because the media prefers sound bites and controversy to intellectual debate. It is also biased.
    I voted for Chris in the previous leadership campaign (I spoke to him after a Chippenham hustings) and almost voted for him again but decided to vote for Nick following a Bristol hustings where I spoke to Nick afterwards. Both men are impressive characters.
  • Martin,
    That is pretty much what I thought but since I resigned over the pledge-breaking in 2010 after some correspondence with Simon Hughes, I basically ignored most of what was going on and just said “somebody else’s problem” But of course it wasn’t…
    The AV referendum was a low point for me… I am a member of the Electoral Reform Society and a big supporter of STV, but AV was so half-hearted I could not bring myself to campaign for it (despite the disgraceful lies put about by the Tories, quite a lot of Labour MP’s and their dogs in the Press). It turned into a referendum on Nick Clegg, and the Party should have realised then what was in store if he continued as leader…

    I voted for Chris Huhne by the way! Well, that would have been a disaster, but I bet we would have been better off now than we are!
  • Although I understand the toxicity of Nick we were between a rock and a hard place. I supported the coalition as it was formed and continued supporting it even though my heart sank from a euphoric state in 2010 each time our team dropped the ball. This should have been such an opportunity that we seemed to continuously fail to grasp. Tuition fees seemed to kick it off and the slide continued through the bedroom tax, the AV referendum, the failure with the Reform Bill and so on. Part of the problem was a vicious and vile personal attack by Labour. Ed Miliband was clearly upset by the fact his mentor Gordon Brown was told by Nick to go and Labour generally feel they own us. Labour also handled the last 5 years badly and they attacks on Nick were not only attacks on the wrong enemy but also undermined their own political strength in collapsing our support. In the west country Labour supporters help defeat Tory candidates by voting Lib Dem. The big question of whether we should have replaced Nick as leader with hindsight seems to be we should have. He had been so viciously attacked and had made so many mistakes that a leadership change may have salvaged some respect for our party. At the time however the idea of changing our leader seemed wrong to me. It could have made us look weak, buckling under pressure, and may have rendered us less able to influence the Tories due to the perceived relationship between Cameron and Nick. So change we must and indeed embrace as this is (as you say) part of the liberal way.
  • Lynda,
    I’m not talking about whether it was right or wrong to go into coalition. That’s in the past and we should just let it go. I’m only talking about what we should do in the future knowing what we know now, having gone through the whole experience including the 2015 election. Nothing is to be gained by constantly re-running May 2010.
    My main point is that what we now know goes beyond the lessons of specific mistakes about specific policies.. Far more important is the inherent difficulty of maintaining our separate identity in a coalition dominated by a party with very different values.
  • Brenda D.
    posted about this on Facebook 2015-05-24 00:15:19 +0100
    david howarth: thoughts on the way forward
  • Brenda D.
    @brendalana tweeted link to this page. 2015-05-24 00:15:16 +0100
  • Proportional representation does not ‘inevitably mean coalition’. Minority government is just as likely an outcome as coalition and in many ways is a more democratic one. Moreover, even if coalitions are formed, that doesn’t mean Liberal Democrats have to join them. It is easier of parties based on representing specific interests to join coalitions and survive them than parties based on values and coherent philosophies. For a party based on values and a coherent philosophy to survive a coalition requires the coalition itself to have had a basis in shared values and overlapping philosophies. The Lib Dem-Conservative coalition had no such basis. The result was that, as the junior partner, the Liberal Democrats simply disappeared from public view, reappearing now and again in the apparent guise of a group of people seemingly determined to hang on to office at all costs. Yes, the coalition was also badly managed, but the lesson to be learned is more findamental than that.
  • I think there’s some muddled thinking here.

    I believe in proper representative democracy – and therefore in proportional representation.

    With several parties, this will inevitably mean a need for coalition. But this article argues against Lib Dems joining coalitions.

    I think the way we did coalition last time was appalling. Coalitions can work for minority parties only if they insist on the right to go public about the deals they do. “We gave way in this as part of a deal which gave us that; in our judgement it was worth it”. Having made a deal is OK to stick to it; but Clegg et al sold is out on many issues that were not part of the coalition agreement. Selling out the NHS by supporting the HSCA – introducing the very “top down reforms” the Tories had pledged not to do; and certainly not part of the coalition agreement – is a crime for which the pummelling they got at the ballot box can only be a tiny part of the necessary punishment.
  • well, what AV does is ensure that MPs who cannot command a majority of the electorate get over 50% with the second and third preferences. It removes the need for tactical voting because you can do that with second preferences. It is better than what we have but not much more proportional – very unlikely that UKIP would have got any more MPs for example. Think of it as a runoff between the top two in a constituency
  • Andrew, thank you. The problem with AV was that nobody could understand how having your second choice elected was supposed to be a good thing. Sure, it might keep the enemy out, but you are supposed to be voting for the candidate you want, not reserve voting for someone else. It came across as confusing when faced with the logic of both FPTP (who wins wins) and PR (the % vote you get is the % MPs you get). Most people myself included had never heard of AV, and assumed any PR referendum would be on PR proper. To people who don’t engage with politics, it was even more confusing because they don’t want to have to think about how it works, they just want to use it. I’m only saying this from my own experience as a (Relatively) intelligent person living in an impoverished town among people whose day to day problems are severe, and no matter how intelligent they are individually the lack of a simple understandable choice meant there was no choice at all. Sorry.
  • Jon, I agree entirely with you about how the coalition could have worked for the Lib Dems. It needed to be an uneasy relationship from the start.

    I am not sure what was complicated about AV though! Easy as numbering 1,2,3 and much simpler (and worse) than the STV system the Irish and Scots (in local government) have no trouble with! What complicated things were the rabid attacks by the press saying all sorts of things that were totally untrue about AV
  • The fiasco of Tuition Fees was an abject surrender to the Conservatives, it showed the public that Clegg, at least, had been lying all along, and it showed that promises that the Lib Dems would bring a different kind of politics were farcical, not to put too fine a point on it. Politics as usual, just with a different player, that is how most people saw it, and vowed not to be taken in again.

    The Coalition could only have worked if the Lib Dems had played hardball and been prepared to collapse the government insisted on trying to pass legislation that attacked their supporters, undermined the values that they had so long said they stood for, and so on. But as Clegg was so intent on staying at all costs, his talk of stability just looked like so much surrendering of principles to people who had supported the party.

    AV, honestly I never even understood this. Most people I know didn’t vote in the referendum because they were confused by it. The only message they were getting was a negative one from the press and that coloured their view. I have no idea myself if it was a good idea or a bad one. It was too complicated to take to a referendum.

    The impression that was gained overall was the Lib Dems trumpeted achievements that may or may not have been due to them, but which by the very definition of the coalition were things that the Tories were not against, anyway.
  • Zigurds Kronbergs
    I was not outraged about tuition fees, although the policy was daft, because it involved spending large sums of money in an attempt to reduce the deficit (hidden behind some mysterious accountancy rules). But the pledges made directly with the voters in your constituency are a special type of pledge, and the electorate rightly spotted that those individual pledges made by individual MP’s were not manifesto commitments, and trumped any coalition agreement. The Lib Dems had portayed themselves for years as the party that kept its promises, and that was destroyed in an instant.

    For the record, I would introduce a graduate tax (a few % per year, up to retirement) to fund universities. What is more, I would make it retrospective ( not backdated, but added to income tax from now on) for all who went to university before the fees/loans era. Including most MP’s, and me. That would actually have helped the deficit…
  • Thanks Ruth. x
  • Personally, I have never understood the unique outrage associated with the tuition fees issue (particularly the synthetic outrage orchestrated by Labour, which introduced tuition fees in the first place), and yes, I did have children who were affected, but see Matthew Huntbach’s letter in Saturday’s Guardian. With a new leader, perhaps we can now at last close that episode and move on.
  • I am one of the recent rejoiners to the Liberal Democrats (having been a member for 23 years up to 2010).
    For me the breaking of the pledge was far worse than joining the coalition. The electorate loved the pledge – it was straightforward and was within the power of every MP, whether in government or not. It should have been absolutely non-negotiable in the coalition agreement. For Nick Clegg to come out and apologise for making the pledge but not for breaking it just made matters worse.

    Breaking the pledge was the main reason for Nick’s hugely negative approval rating, which has dogged the Lib Dems for the entire parliament. I like Nick Clegg and respect much of what he stands for and has achieved in coalition, but he was damaged goods from then on, and damaged the rest of the party (even those who stuck to the pledge) at every stage. I made my own pledge not to be a member or deliver a leaflet for the party while he was leader, which I have stuck to.

    Regarding centrism, I agree completely with David Howarth. The Labour party is going to lurch back to the right and there will be no room between them and the Tories. We need to redefine the political map as a triangle with apices Conservatism, Socialism and Liberalism. Our core values are very different from the other parties on so many issues. The most distinctive for me that affects every other policy is a distrust of centralism of power, whether in big business or government. That told me without even pausing to think about it that a top-down reorganisation of the NHS was a big mistake, for example. Backing STV is another example of giving power to people over parties – I was so very disappointed that the Lib Dems went for an AV referendum, which is not remotely proportional and was easily portrayed as being motivated mainly by self-interest
  • Jo come back x
  • Like Zigurds Kronbergs, I think that the personal animus towards Nick Clegg shown by David is a regrettable characteristic of those who opposed the Coalition. It is surely possible to accept that like many decisions in life there was no clear cut answer as to how to proceed in 2010. Moreover, comparisons with the 1930s are easy to make in retrospect, but the Britain of 2010 was a very different world to that of 1930. However, just as Ed Miliband’s belief that Britain had moved to the left between 2010 and 2015 has proved incorrect, so those of us who supported the Coalition must accept that the experiment has failed and that the British people do not reward a junior coalition partner, particularly in the absence PR as a safety net. Even so, while David’s proposals do indeed offer a way forward for the next five years, given the fact that we now have a majority Government, if only in terms of the parliamentary arithmetic, I do not find his reference to New Zealand very convincing in charting a course in the event of a future minority government, whether Labour or Conservative. Indeed it seems to me that the only way the LDs could continue to advance in these circumstances would be a minority Conservative Government dependent on UKIP and DUP support. Any other outcome in 2020 would set back any progress made by the LDs in the coming five years.
  • Nick Clegg tried to prove to the British public that Continental-style politics and coalitions were workable and could become the new mould for political reforms.

    While he managed some limited success in that arena , overall his experiment has decimated the party and alienated many voters — including myself.

    I agree with much of what David has said — the Liberal Democrats must be a party of values. But we also must not ignore evidence — and one of the most painful lessons to draw from Thursday’s results is the clear and evident fact that British FPTP elections can not be fought with the view of forming Continental-style coalitions.
  • It doesn’t imply that at all. We now know a lot more than we knew in 2010. We know first hand how coalition with the Tories works. I am not re-running the past but thinking about what to do in the future. We need to incorporate into our thinking what we have learned. That is the only rational way to proceed.
    On that basis, what I am saying is that it would be incredibly stupid to enter into another coalition with the Tories.
    Someone from D66 once remarked that their experience was that ‘to govern is to halve’ – that is, every time they went into government their vote was cut in half. But they have PR as protection against complete wipe out. We don’t. We are lucky to have any MPs at all. There is no point talking about coalition negotiations on this policy or that policy when the result could easily be the end of the party.
  • I agree with much of what David says; given the result, how could you disagree? But to say "we must never again enter coalition with the Tories implies that we could have done otherwise in 2010 if our concern was for the national interest rather than our own party interest. The leadership was right, having investigated the alternatives, to propose it, and the membership were right, in full knowledge of the likely consequences, to endorse this at the special conference – though I know David’s local party largely voted against.
    Since it seems we are stuck with a winner-takes-all electoral system, despite its blatant unfairness (primarily to others this time), it is quite probably that the circumstances of 2010 may never occur again. We all thought there was going to be a balanced parliament again this time, but it seems probably we have reverted to majority government by parties with a minority of the vote.
    If the circumstances ever arose again that Lib Dem MPs were in a position to hold the balance, we would have to consider a coalition with the largest party initially as one of the options. One of the problems of supply and confidence arrangements is that they can lead to almost weekly negotiations as each important vote looms. Far better, in a time of economic crisis at least, to have a negotiated programme for government – and that means compromises, to some extent by both parties.
    It will be difficult to change our adversarial culture of politics, where one party must claim that the other has everything wrong, while we have our current electoral system; and it will be difficult for us as a smaller party to break through again, as we so nearly did in 2010, because it will always be possible for them larger party to scare people off voting for us for fear of the alternative – in this case the SNP. But should the opportunity ever arise again, it is not coalition we should avoid, it is the type of coalition agreement which depends on unanimity on every issue. Of course we should have retained the freedom to advocate a different policy on tuition fees, even if with hindsight the one we ended up – and most MPs had pledged to oppose, was arguably a better outcome.. We should have moved to a less adversarial system, where the whips did not instruct every MP to use every media opportunity to condemn the failings of the Labour government, but rather to advocate our distinctive approach.
    I suspect a lot of ordinary members like myself, who have never stood for parliament, support the party because it stands up for what is right even when it isn’t to our short-term advantage; and supported Nick because he was the best leader, even if we were wrong to believe the voters would eventually come to realise this. Now that Nick has stood down, it seems many voters have realised this, but too late to be of any use to us.
  • Zigurds: On Nick, I am merely referring to the polling evidence, especially that in the British Election Study data and in the longer YouGov time series. If one analyses the BES data to investigate what kind of voter voted for us in 2010 but not in 2015, what one finds is that, controlling for all the other significant variables (mainly alienation from all politics and being a woman) the most powerful explanatory variable for not voting for us was not liking Nick. The consequences of the August 2010 speech can also be seen in the polls, and was one of the four events that appear to have taken our rating from over 20% to under 10% between May 2010 and January 2011 (the others being entering the coalition in the first place, Osborne’s first budget and fees).
    Kim: I’m not sure I understand your argument. ‘We have to compromise. Coalition is a form of compromise, Therefore we have to accept coalition’ is, with respect, an example of the fallacy of the undistributed middle. There are other forms of compromise available, so that even if you are right about having to compromise, the question is what kind of compromise to engage in. Coalition hides the process of compromise from the public and leads to a pretence that both partners have no doubts about the agreed policy. They both defend it as if they had never held any other view, But that is prexisely how coalition obscures the party’s values from public view. A more open, issue by issue approach, on the other hand, lets daylight into the process and allows the party to explain in terms of its own values how it got to where it got.
  • I agree very largely with David’s analysis, although I do not share his apparent personal animus against Nick Clegg. Nick has been brave and resilient, refusing to reply in kind to the vitriol directed against him from left and right. I also believe that on balance it was right to go into coalition in 2010. Isn’t the whole aim of a political party to put its policies into practice? However, we should not have entered the coalition with such relish and we allowed ourselves to be outmanoeuvred at every turn in the first few years. Yes, the economy was in crisis, but buying into the myth that the recession was caused by Labour’s overspending locked us into the Tory rhetoric. We should be proud of what we did achieve, but the price was defending the savage welfare cuts, and it is arguable that the Osborne/Alexander austerity programme actually delayed the recovery by two years.

    By the time we actually began to make public where we disagreed with the Tories, no-one was prepared to believe us. With the help of the Tory press, we were left to carry the can for the Coalition’s unpopular policies while the Tories shamelessly stole the credit for the good ones.

    So we come to the doomed 2015 campaign. As Naomi says, it should have been abundantly clear to those at the top, who are supposed to know these things, that simply offering another coalition and promising to act as a brake on the other parties was not only deeply uninspiring but also guaranteed to lock our support at the disastrously low level it had reached. Whatever the polls said (and they were absolutely right about our vote share) we should have set out our vision of what we stood for and delivered a positive message to bring back the core electorate and attract new supporters. Red lines in case there had to be coalition negotiations, certainly (and why was there not one on no to an EU referendum?), but as a secondary issue, not as our raison d’être.

    The future is grim. A look at the detailed results makes for dispiriting reading. Over 300 lost deposits; fourth or fifth places where we were once a strong second or even held the seat in the relatively recent past (e.g. Newbury, Totnes) and the loss of Short money to reflect our new parliamentary status will impose severe financial restraints and job losses at HQ, and the haemorrhaging of councillors will deprive us of activists and the local momentum to recover lost ground.

    Before we elected a new leader (from a desperately narrow pool of candidates) we should really first have decided where we stand and what we stand for, but the Federal Executive’s undue haste (in my opinion) has deprived us of that opportunity.

    It is absolutely clear to me that we should identify ourselves clearly as a left-of-centre, European and internationalist party of social justice and individual freedom. We should abandon the pretence that we are somehow ‘above’ the left-right spectrum. We must never again allow ourselves to buy into the Tory ideology that the markets are our masters not our servants. We shouldn’t be ashamed to adopt Labour’s policy to abolish non-dom tax status or the Greens’ policy to bring academies and free schools back under local-authority (i.e. democratic) control, to stop the insidious privatisation of state-funded education.

    It will be a long, hard road back even to where we stood on 6 May, let alone greater heights. And some of us are at an age when we may not live to see that achievement. But we can make a start now by opposing the snooper’s charter, fight to preserve our adherence to the ECHR and start campaigning NOW to save the UK’s membership of the European Union.